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A new epoch in space travel—the era of reusable
space vehicles—opened with the launch of NASA's
Space Shuttle from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at
10:10 a.m EST, November 12, 1981. The manned
Space Shuttle orbiter Columbia flew into space again,
making It the first space vehicle to be used more than
once—another step toward certi'ying Space Shuttle
as an operational spacecraft.
Co^u%nbta is the first of four planned orbiters, the
part of the Space Shut t le that carries peo lple and
cargo into space. Other major Shuttle parts are the
solid rocket boosters that, iike the orbiter, are
designed to be recovered and reused. and the
external propellant tank which is jettisoned on each
flight into orbit and not recovered.
The Space Shuttle is the primary launch vehicle of
NASA's Space Transportation System (STS)_ This
mission, called STS-2, is the second of four orbital
flight tests designed to Improve and ready STS for
operational use.
Fuel Cell Problem Shortens Mission
The flight test was planned to last for more than five
days. However, early on the first day, trouble
developed in one of Columbia's fu- 1 cells that convert
hydrogen and oxygen Into electrical power for the
spacecraft and drinking water for the crew. With one of
three fuel cells malfunctioning, mission safety rules
called for STS-2 to be reduced to a minimal mission
lasting 54 hours (36 orbits of Earth). After some
deliberation, test managers decided to go by the book.
As a result, the crew—NASA astronauts Joe H. Engle,
commander, and Richard H. Truly, pilot—reluctantly
cut short their space mission, landing Columbia at
4:23 p m. EST, November 14, at Edwards Air Force
Base. California. i heir total flight time was 2 days, 6
hours, 13 rnmutes and 12 seconds.
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Close-i p of STS-2 at iortrbon. Right to left: The orbiter Columbia,	 Most of Goals Achieved
the external propellant tank, and one of the Iwo solid -propellant
	
Although their time In space was reduced by more
boosters	 than half, Engle and Truly crammed extra work Into
President Chats With Orbiting Crow
About 7 p.n,., November 13, President Reagan
visited the Mission Control Center at the Johnson
Space Center, Houston, Texas. He chatted with
Engle and Truly in the orbiting Columbia, jokingly
asking to hitch a ride with them to California. On a
serious note, he told them that the whole nation and
the world were watching them with great pride.
the available time, prow' .g abundant good data for
orbital flight test engineers and other experimenters.
They achieved more than 90 percent of the objectives
set for STS-2.
Robot Arm Tested
Among their major goals was the first test in space of
a Canadian-built remote manipulator system. The
system is comprised of a huge mechanical arm,
operating from Columbia's cavernous payload bay
and guided by controls on Columbia's control deck.
The system is designed to deploy payloads into orbit
and retrieve them, as well as for other freight -handling
activities in space. The arm can even be used to reach
around and inspect various external parts of
Columbia. It has its own lighting system and closed-
circuit television so that the crews operating it have a
close-up view of what they are doing.
The mechanical arm is jointed like r. human arm at
the shoulder, elbow, and wrist. Fully extended, it is
15.3 meters (50 feet) long. It is 38 centimeters (15
inches) in diameter. Despite its size, it is made of
sturdy, lightweight materials giving it a weight on Earth
of only 408 kilograms (900 pounds). The human
analogy ends with the wrist. Its "hand," called an "end
effector," consists of a snare wire device that can be
tightened around grapples attached to the payloads.
Engle and Truly operated the arm in all of its modes,
ranging from fully automatic, in which it is pro-
grammed in advance by computer to perform a series
of operations, to fully manual, in which it is operated
directly from a control panel that bypasses the
computer.
Engle and Truly did not move loads with the arm, as
this test was not planned. They did let the arm's
camera picture them holding a sign saying "Hi, Mom"!
A vital part of their test was swinging the arm back
onto its cradle pedestals along the left side of
Columbia's payload bay and latching it there. They
accomplished this critical task expeditiously and
expertly.
Good Data Obtained
As in STS-1, the first Space Shuttle orbital flight test,
Columbia carried a complement of instruments to re-
cord the performance characteristics of its 'various
systems. Valuable engineering data were a , ,xumu-
lated by a flight information recorder. In STS-1, the
recorder malfunctioned, losing the data. This loss was
serious because the orbital flight tests are designed
primarily to find and remedy defects in the Shuttle
system and qualify it for routine operation.
In addition to
e
ga=heri engineering dam, Cokart* In
STS-2 eructed experiments that would oontre
to such fields as prospecting for oil, gas, coal, and
minerals, locating promising ocean fishing Wounds,
understanding how gravity affects plant growth,
forecasting thunderstorms and other severe weather,
and measuring air pollution. (coals for the experkneft
included: determi ^g whether CoPumble cotddprovide a stable piatfor. n for conducting Earth
surveys, testing advanced techniquies and Wahiments
to surrey Earth from space, mid gatherkp dot about
Earth's resources and environment. STS-2 met these
objectives despite the shortened mission although it
did not provide all of the data about Earth's
environment and resources that were originall y called
for.
For the most part, the instruments worked auto-
matically. Engle and Truly were also scheduled to take
many photographs of lightning bolts as pad of one of
the experiments.
Most of the instruments for these experiments were
carried in an engineering model of the Spacelab pallet
installed in Columbia's payload bay. The Spacelab
palest not only provided a structure on to which to
mount SAperiments but also such support as electrical
power. The pallet is designed for experiments requir-
ing a broad field of view or direr.! exposure to the
space environment.
The Earth survey experiments nevded an
unobstructed and brcad view of Earth, making the
SpacelaL pallet a welcome advantage. Data from
these experiments were accumulated ^n. ^.+ Umbis
rather than radioed to Earth so that Grlumbla's data
transmission capabilities could be devoted to flight
test information. The experiment data were provided
to the experimenters after Columbia landed.
As in any flight test program, the orbital flight tests
are designed to identify and resolve unanticipated
problems. Some of these problems result in launch
delays. The test program, among other things, is
designed to shorten turnaround time.
Fuel Spill Damages Tiles
In September, launch of the Shuttle was significantly
set back when nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer being
pumped into Columbia's attitude control rocket tanks
spilled onto the heat-shielding tiles. The oxidizer acted
like a solvent, dissolving the cement beneath the tiles.
A total of about 380 tiles had to be carefully cemented
back onto the Shuttle.
Just before the launch on November 4, the count-
down computer called for a hold in the countdown.
During the hold, high oil pressures were discovered in
two of Columbia's three auxiliary power units (APUs)
that operate the craft's hydraulic system. The
hydraulic system swivels Columbia's rocket engines
during launch and operates its aerodynamic controls
and landing gear after atmosphere entry when the
spacecraft becomes an aircraft. The oil filters in two of
the APUs were found to be clogged and were
replaced. This set the launch bac.% to November 12 at
7:30 a.m. EST.
However, unexplained problems arose with
Columbia's multiplexer-demultiplexer which
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processes and displays data on the c. aft s condition
for both Columbia's crew and the Mission Control
Center, Johnson Space Center. Houston, Texas. New
ones were removed from another orbiter (Challenger),
which is under construction in California, and flown to
Kennedy. This delayed the 7:30 launch to 10 a.m.
Another ten minutes were added to give the launch
team time to make ''double sure' every thing was all
right.
Shock Waves Reduced
STS-2 lift-off was a model of perfection. The problem
of the shock waves f _n the rocket blas t that had bent
several of Columbia's fuel tank supports in STS-1
was solved by a newly-developed water-deluge
system installed at the bottom of the launch pad.
STS-2 roars upward on pill it of fire
Some 300,000 gallons of water sprayed into the rocket
exhaust damped the shock wave by more than 75
percent, preventing damage to Columbia.
The booster rockets and the external propellant tank
detached and fell to ocean areas as planned. The
booster casings were recovered, but some two days
after parachuting into the Atlantic Ocean. Recovery
was hampered by h igh winds and waves.
Opening and closing of the payload bay doors were
successful. The craft was turned belly upward so that
its instruments could look down on Farth.
Despite the smoothness of the flight, the failed fuel
cell proved too worrisome to warrant attempting the
planned 83(+) orbit mission. Among considerations
was that, if another fuel cell failed, Columbia would
not have enough electric power to both brir.g itself in
and acquire vital data such as heat ng on the craft
during atmosphere entry. Such data were lost on
STS-1. Engineers estimated that some 50 percent of
the data they needed was on atmosphere entry. The
judgment of flight test managers was that the risks of a
longer flight far outweighed possible gains.
Fuel cells have a long record of reliable use on
manned spacecraft since the 1960s and were
considered among the least likely components to go
wrong. The only other fuel cell problems—those on
Gemini 5 and Apollo 13—were due to the fuel tank or
fuel line and not to the cell itself. The nature of the fuel
cell breakdown in STS-2 is under study.
Crew Achieves Smooth Landing
Engle anc. Truly followed the same course in returning
from orbit as did Crippen and Young in STS-1:
retrofire over the Indian Ocean, atmosphere entry over
the western Pacific Ocean, transition to aerodynamic
controls in the atmosphere to land as an aircraft
This time Columbia was guided to its landing site by
a microwave scanning beam landing system on the
site. This time, also, Engle put the craft through rolls
V.
Underside of Columbia as it came in for landing on November
14 Photograph was taken by chase plane to show condition of
thermal tiles on underside No te also trading vortices from
Columbia s wrngtips
and other maneuvers to test how it handled under
stress. However, most of the desnent was in the
automatic mode until flare (leveling off) when Engle
took the controls. Plans for a crosswind landing were
dropper' because of winds gusting to 25 knots, too
high for ,afety. Engle made a perfect touchdown
despite extensive cloud cover that made the Edwards
Air Force Base site marginal for landing. As in STS-1,
Engle and Truly landed on Runway 23, Edwards Air
Force Base, California. The runway is a dry lake bed
in the Mojave Desert. Touchdown was at 4:23 p.m.
EST, November 14.
Shortly after Columbia landed, it was surrounded by
vehicles and technicians who took measures to
remove dangerous concentrations of explosive or
poisonous gases from Columbia's payicad bay and
along its surface. They also ventilated Columbia. After
Columbia's vicinity was determined to be safe, Engle
and Truly left the spacecraft and stepped down their
landing ladder. The time was 5:05 p.m. EST.
Tka Survive Mission Well
Preliminary inspection of Columbia indicated that it
came through STS-2 with much less wear and tear
than it did in STS-1. In STS-1, all or part of 16 heat-
shielding tiles were lost and 148 others were
damaged. In STS-2 no tiles were lost and only about
a dozen were damaged and will need to be replaced.
The improvement is attributed to changes in launch
procedures, including the shock-absorbing water
spray system on the launching pad, and to toughening
of tiles in particularly vulnerable areas. Columbia's
exterior is covered by nearly 31,000 heat-resistant
tiles that protect the craft. More than 2,200-degree
heating was generated on exterior surfaces by the
entry into the atmosphere on return to Earth.
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